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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tortious act or "wrong" to the other contracting party, the wrongdoer
will be precluded from profiting by an enforcement of his second
contract.
5 4
ROBERT M. POST.
PICKETING-SCOPE OF RELIEF UNDER THE NEW YORK
ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT
I
It is most interesting to note the first judicial dispositions of
cases involving organization to secure wage increases and picketing.
In 1835 a combination of bootmakers, to raise their wages, was in-
dicted for peaceable co-operation for the purpose of maintaining the
rate of wages. The court held that such combinations and confedera-
cies to enhance or reduce the price of labor were injurious to trade,
and monopolistic in aspect.' Business was upheld as a property right
which equity would enjoin from injury.2 In another action involving
the right to picket, the court similarly enjoined the defendant on the
ground that it was a public obstruction and a private nuisance in
violation of the right to do business freely.3 judicial attitude was
rapidly changing, and, towards the end of the century, we find the first
assertions that combination, appeal, persuasion,4 and picketing 5 are
legal means of obtaining larger wages. Legislative recognition fos-
tered this change, and in 1870 it was enacted that the "orderly and
peaceable assembling or co-operation of persons employed in any pro-
fession, trade or handicraft, for the purpose of securing an advance in
the rate of wages or compensation" is now permitted.6 Thus the
common law actions of conspiracy 7 and enticing away of workmen 8
54 11 A. L. R. 698; RESTATEMENT, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 576.
1 People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 2, 18 (N. Y. 1835) ("He may say that he
will not make coarse boots for less than one dollar but he has no right to say
that no other mechanic shall make them for less").
2 People v. Barondess, 61 Hun 571, 16 N. Y. Supp. 436 (1st Dept. 1891);
Davis v. Zimmerman, 91 Hun 481, 36 N. Y. Supp. 303 (1895) ; Kerbs v. Rosen-
stien, 56 App. Div. 619, 67 N. Y. Supp. 385 (1st Dept. 1900); Mills v. U. S.
Printing Co., 99 App. Div. 605, 91 N. Y. Supp. 185 (2d Dept. 1904) ; Rogers v.
Evarts, - Misc. -, 17 N. Y. Supp. 264 (1891).
3 Gilbert v. Mickle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 357 (N. Y. 1846) (defendant picketed
the plaintiff's auction rooms to warn strangers of mock auctions).
4 People v. Wilzig, 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 403 (1886) ; People v. Kostka, 4 N. Y.
Cr. Rep. 429 (1886).
5 Levy v. Rosenstein, 66 N. Y. Supp. 101 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
6 N. Y. Laws 1870, c. 19.
7 Two or more persons who conspire to prevent another from exercising a
lawful trade or calling, or by interfering or threatening to interfere with prop-
erty belonging to or used by another, or with the use or employment thereof,
are guilty of a misdemeanor.
8 Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 9 Abb. (N. C.) 393 (N. Y. 1880)
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gave way to the declaration that free competition between employer
and labor was worth more to society than it costs.9 On this ground a
consequent infliction of damage to business is privileged, and the
doctrine that picketing was per se illegal 10 gave way to the suggestion
that threats, intimidations, coercion or force must be established by
proof before an injunction will issue. 1
The New York Court of Appeals had attained a well deserved
reputation as the outstanding liberal court in the country on labor
questions.' 2
II
Prior to Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act, the Court had
evidenced a marked desire to limit the injunction, and avoid judicial
interference in labor disputes.13 The Court had upheld a union's
right to refuse to allow its members to work on non-union materials,14
or to refuse to handle goods loaded and delivered by non-union
labor; 1r had condemned decisions prohibiting picketing in the absence
of a strike; allowed picketing directed against a product at the place of
sale; 16 had refused to curtail picketing because of a terminable yellow
dog contract; 1' had upheld the right to picket despite the existence of
a closed shop contract with a rival union; 18 and had limited sweeping
injunctions to specific unlawful acts.19 The legislative enactment of
(Injunction should not be granted against a confederation of persons whose
object is to entice away workmen from their employers in the absence of
violence or coercion).
9 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111 (Mass. 1842).
10 The doctrine that all picketing is illegal was followed in California, Illi-
nois, Michigan and New Jersey. New York held it enjoinable as "injurious to
trade". Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582 (C. C. Iowa 1905);
Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909); Barnes v.
Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 424, 83 N. E. 940 (1908) ; Beck v. Ry. Teamsters
Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13 (1898); Baldwin Lumber Co. v. Brother-
hood of Teamsters, 91 N. J. Eq. 240, 109 Atl. 147 (1920); Gilbert v. Mickle,
45 Sandf. Ch. 357 (N. Y. 1846).
" Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v. Delaney, 48 App. Div. 623, 62 N. Y. Supp.
250 (1st Dept. 1900) ; Davis v. Zimmerman, 91 Hun 481, 36 N. Y. Supp. 303(1895); Levy v. Rosenstein, 66 N. Y. Supp. 101 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
22 (1936) 5 INr. Juu. Ass'T But. 59.
'3 Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130(1927) ; Stillwell Theatres v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932).
14 flossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582 (1917) ; Wilson and
Adams Co. v. Pearce, 264 N. Y. 281, 19 N. E. (2d) 545 (1934).
'IsExchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130(1927).
16 Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937) ; (1938)
12 ST. JonN's L. Rav. 358.
'7 Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 159 N. E. 864(1928).
18 Stillwell Theatres v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932).
19 J. H. S. Theatres v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932) ; Wise
Shoe Co. v. Lowenthal, 266 N. Y. 264, 194 N. E. 749 (1935).
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Section 876-a obviously intended 20 to affirm these results, and limit
judicial discretion still further.2 ' The lower courts adopted a restric-
tive attitude with respect to labor activities, 22 and interpreted the Act
as merely regulatory of the procedure of granting injunctions, without
making any changes in th substantive law.23 In confining the right
to picket peacefully, the lower courts have evolved a series of excep-
tions in which an injunction will issue in the absence of a finding
that a labor dispute exists.2 4 For example, if the union engages in
any form of extreme, violent or unlawful conduct,25 the requirements
of the Act may be dispensed with; where an employer avoided the
possibility of a dispute by closing his doors; 26 where the lone worker
struck and the plaintiff carried on with his wife and son; 27 when the
employer took over the job of his sole employee; 28 where the parties
were not in "unity of interest"; 29 where employer signed a contract
20 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 876-a: "The policy of this state is declared as
follows: Equity procedure that permits a complaining party to obtain sweeping
injunctive relief that is not preceded by or conditioned upon adequate notice
and hearing of the responding party or parties, or that issues after a hearing
based upon written affidavits alone and not upon examination, confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses in open court, is peculiarly subject to abuses in
labor litigations for the reason that among other things,
(1) The status quo cannot be maintained but is necessarily altered by the
injunction,
(2) Determination of issues of veracity and of probability of fact from
affidavits of opposing parties that are contradicted, and under the
circumstances, untrustworthy rather than from oral examination in
open court is subject to grave error,
(3) Error in issuing the injunctive relief is usually irreparable to the
opposing party, and
(4) Delay incident to the normal course of appellate practice frequently
makes ultimate correction of error in law or in fact unavailing in the
particular dase."
21 Feinberg, Picketing, Free Speech, and "Labor Disputes" (1940) 17 N. Y.
U. L. Q. Rv. 385.22 Note (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 537.
23 Remington Rand, Inc. v. Crofoot, 248 App. Div. 356, 289 N. Y. Supp.
1025 (4th Dept.), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 636, 18 N. E. (2d) 37 (1938) ; May's Furs &
Ready-To-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 255 App. Div. 356, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 819 (2d
Dept. 1939); Greater City Master Plumbers' Union v. Kahme, 6 N. Y. S. (2d)
589 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Everett v. Penna, 169 Misc. 589, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 630
(1938).
24 See note 21, supra.
25 May's Furs & Ready-To-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 255 App. Div. 643, 8 N.
Y. S. (2d) 819 (2d Dept. 1939).
28 Paul v. Mencher, 169 Misc. 657, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 821 (1937).
27 Luft v. Flove, 270 N. Y. 640, 1 N. E. (2d) 369 (1936); Botnick v.
Winokur, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 6 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Pitter v. Kaminsky, 7 N. Y. S.(2d) 10 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Wishny v. Jones, 169 Misc. 459, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 2
(1938).
28 Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674 (1937).
29 Canepa v. Doe, 277 N. Y. 52, 12 N. E. (2d) 790 (1938) ; People v.
Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. (2d) 238 (1939) (if no unity of interest,
disorderly conduct); American Gas Stations v. Doe, 250 App. Div. 227, 293
N. Y. Supp. 1019 (2d Deot. 1937); Mlle. Reif, Inc. v. Randau, 166 Misc. 247,
1 N. Y. S. (2d) 315 (1937) ; cf. Davega City Radio, Inc. v. Randau, 166 Misc.
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on the basis of false representations; 30 where the union had been
denied permission to do business in the state 31 or where all of plain-
tiff's employees were members of a union which was a rival of the
picketing organization.32  These decisions disregard the established
law of the state that labor has an inherent right to picket peacefully, 33
and contravene the express statutory provision that no item of relief
granted prohibit "giving publicity to and * * * communicating infor-
mation regarding the * * * dispute, whether by advertising, com-
municating information, speaking, picketing * * * or by any other
method not involving fraud or breach of the peace." 34 In the case of
Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees Union,3 5 the Court of
Appeals enjoined all picketing on the grounds of prior unlawful con-
duct,30 and confirmed the lower court's conviction that the anti-
injunction statute was merely declaratory of the common law, and
purely procedural.37 In a vigorous dissent, Lehman, J., reiterated
that "the legislature has in effect now said to the courts that prohibi-
tion of lawful picketing shall not be granted as an item of relief where
the desired end might be obtained by prohibitions less complete."
Two recent decisions 38 by the Court of Appeals 39 mark a recession
by the court from the position taken in the Busch case.40 In May's
Furs atnd Ready-To-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer,41 the court reconsidered the
assertion made by the lower court, that violence removed the defen-
dant "beyond the pale and protection of Section 876-a", and that hav-
ing become outlaws, they were not entitled to the protection of the
statute. It held that, in the absence of unlawful conduct, no injunc-
tion can issue even in the absence of Section 876-a; that the need for
statutory safeguards can only exist where the defendant has been
246, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 514 (1937) ; Well & Co. v. Doe, 168 Misc. 211, 5 N. Y. S.(2d) 559 (1938).
30 Bard & Margolies v. Marcus, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 3, 1938, p. 1947, col. 1.
31 Hoffman's Vegetarian Restaurant v. Lee, 170 Misc. 815, 10 N. Y. S.
(2d) 287 (1939).
32 Stalban v. Friedman, 171 Misc. 106, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 978 (1939).
Contra: Stillwell Theatres v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932).
33 Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931).
34 N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 477.
35 168 Misc. 224, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (1938), aff'd, 255 App. Div. 970,
82 N. Y. S. (2d) 819, aff'd, 281 N. Y. 150, 22 N. E. (2d) 320 (1939).
36 Citing as authority cases decided before § 876-a. Nann v. Raimist, 255
N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931) ; Wise Shoe Co. v. Lowenthal, 266 N. Y. 264,
157 N. E. 249 (1935).
37 (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rav. 1183 (scalding criticism of decision).38 May's Furs & Ready-To-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E.
(2d) 279, (1940) mod'g, 255 App. Div. 643, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 819 (2d Dept.);
Baillis v. Fuchs, 283 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. (2d) 812 (1940).
39 It is to be noted, that on Jan. 1, 1940 three new members of the court
took their places on the bench. Judge Lehman, who dissented in the Busch
case, is now Chief Judge.
40 (June, 1940) 8 IN ER. JuRm. Ass'x BULL 130.
41 See note 38, supra.
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guilty of some unlawful activity and is liable to restraint.42 Further,
it was stated that there can be no basis for a perpetual injunction
insofar as the statutory limitation on injunctions in labor disputes is
limited to six months. 43 Thus, the Busch case does not outlaw unions
that fail to live up to their "legal responsibilities". The May's case
is not merely representative of a victory for labor, but serves as a
"judicial correction of a former erroneous construction of an unam-
biguous statute." 44 In a later case, 45 the court followed the May's
case and decreed that a sweeping injunction be modified so "as to
permit unionists their unquestioned right to picket peacefully." 46
This right exists despite the fact that none of the employees were
affiliated with any union, and were completely satisfied with their
wages and working conditions. "It is the settled law of this state that
the legitimate interests of a labor union are not confined to acts
directed against an employer of its members."
III
The United States Supreme Court recently had an opportunity
to ascertain the status of labor's right to picket peacefully. In Thorn-
hill v. The State of Alabama,47 the Court held unconstitutional and
void on its face a statute prohibiting loitering or picketing.48 "Free
42 Learned counsel for the defendant very ably argued that "the very statute
which contains the prohibition against the issuance of injunctive relief against
peaceful picketing itself, contemplates that unlawful acts have been committed
by the defendant." Section 876-a (1) (a) : "That unlawful acts have * * *
been threatened or committed * * *." Thus, even though unlawful acts have
been committed, the statute deprives the court from issuing a blanket injunction.
(f) "no item of relief" shall prohibit (5) "Giving publicity to and obtaining or
communicating information regarding the existence of, or the facts involved, in
any dispute. * * *"
43 This reversed the ruling of a perpetual injunction granted in the Busch
case.
44 See note 40, supra.
45 Baillis v. Fuchs, 283 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. (2d) 812 (1940).
46 See note 45, supra, at 138; Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323,
58 Sup. Ct. 578 (1938) ; semble Lisse v. Local Union, c. W. W., 24 P. (2d) 833
(Cal. 1933), affd, 2 Cal. (2d) 312, 41 P. (2d) 314 (1935) (no statute) ; Inter-
national Pocketbook Workers Union v. Orlove, 158 Md. 496, 148 At. 826
(1930) (no statute); Driggs Dairy Farms v. Milk Drivers Union, 49 Ohio
App. 303, 197 N. E. 250 (1935) (unlawful conduct restrained; reasonable,
truthful and peaceable persuasion permitted). Contra: Joe Dan Market v.
Wentz, 223 Mo. App. 772, 20 S. W. (2d) 567 (1929); Wise Shoe Co. v.
Lowenthal, 266 N. Y. 264, 194 N. E. 749 (1935); Bert Amusement Corp. v.
Holmden, 243 App. Div. 81, 276 N. Y. Supp. 236 (1st Dept. 1934) ; (1938) 116
A. L. R. 528. The propriety of restraining all picketing depends upon the
danger to be reasonably anticipated.
47 Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940).
48ALA. CODE (1923) §3448 (The statute provided, that "any person or
persons who * * * go near to or loiter about the premises or place of business
of any other person, firm or corporation * * * for the purpose or with the
intent of influencing or inducing other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell
to, have business dealings with or be employed by such persons *** shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor").
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discussion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of
labor disputes appear to us indispensable to the effective and intelli-
gent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny
of modern industrial society * * * the group in power at any moment
may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of
matters of public interest. * * *" 49 Affirmation of these convictions
was accorded in the case of Carlson v. California.0 An anti-picketing
ordinance 51 was there considered, and held similar to that in the case
of Thornhill v. Alabamna,52 and thus governed by its reasoning. "The
carrying of signs and banners * * * is a natural and appropriate means
of conveying information on matters of public concern * * *, pub-
licizing the facts of a labor dispute * * * by pamphlet, by word of
mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as within that liberty of
communication, which is secured to every person by the Fourteenth
Amendment against abridgment by the state." M (Italics mine.) The
further problem now arises as to the extent of permissible interference
with such right.54  Lower court decisions in New York construe
these constitutional rights to be afforded only where the controversy
falls within the accepted definition of a "labor dispute".55
A rationalization of the problem of picketing shows that the right
of peaceful picketing cannot be usurped for, if the defendant has com-
mitted acts of violence, a restraining decree will specify and prohibit
only those acts allowing the defendant to do the acts not restrained,
i.e., peaceful picketing. If, however, all acts are violent, then an
injunction will affect all activity and there will be ,no remainder of
peaceful picketing. Therefore, it is submitted that in no case should
a court issue a sweeping injunction, as the same result may be obtained
by enumerating the specific unlawful conduct. It would be overstep-
ping the limitations of Section 876-a to include peaceful and lawful
activities among the proscriptions.
HARRY LORBER.
49 Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 103, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940).
50 310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940).
51 The ordinance forbade loitering or picketing or displaying any banner,
badge or sign in the vicinity of a factory or place of employment for the purpose
of influencing any person from entering or- from purchasing goods, or to refrain
from entering into service there. -
52 Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940).
53 Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106, 112, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940).
54 (Summer, 1940) 1 BILL. oF RIGHTS REv. 59.
55 People v. De Julis, 174 Misc. 836 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; Meltzer v. Siegelman,
174 Misc. 995 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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